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I. INTRODUCTION
The saga of the corporate machine consists of various stages
whereby states are attempting to conform their corporate laws with other
laws or acts.' One recent stage in this saga concerns the corporate scan-
dals of the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries2 and states'
subsequent attempts to conform their corporate laws to the changes of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. These scandals compelled Congress to reevalu-
ate and to replace the then-existing corporate laws with more restrictive
laws.3 These new laws necessitated that corporate attorneys shift their
t J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2007; B.S. Information Systems Management,
Brigham Young University, 2002. The author dedicates this Comment to his wife, Tavia, for her
unwavering love and support during a couple of the most challenging, yet rewarding, years of our
lives. The author would like to thank his parents, Brent and Joyce, for their many years of support,
love, and encouragement, and Bryan and Holly Holt, for their love and support during the author's
law school years. Finally, the author would like to thank Jonathan Mark and the Seattle University
Law Review for their editing support, and Professor Eric Chiappinelli for his guidance in the au-
thor's understanding of other general corporate law concepts.
1. See Ray Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REV 412 (1952).
2. A couple of the most notable scandals involved companies such as Enron and WorldCom.
See Keith L. Johnson, Rebuilding Corporate Boards and Refocusing Shareholders for the Post-
Enron Era, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 788 (2002). The Enron scandal involved Enron's upper manage-
ment fraudulently reporting the company's financial condition to the SEC on its 10-Q and 10-K
forms. See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's Perspec-
tive, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 69-82 (2005). In particular, Enron attempted to hide its true debt con-
dition, to manipulate its market-to-market accounting, and to secretly manipulate its monetization
revenues. Id. The WorldCom scandal, also involving fraudulent reporting to the SEC, included au-
diting where operating costs were improperly recorded as capital expenditures to disguise huge
losses as even bigger gains. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life
and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 369-70 (2003).
3. "In July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed. The Act was in response to events re-
garding accounting issues at large public companies and the ensuing calls for action to prevent repe-
tition of these abuses." Edward D. Herlihy, Contests for Corporate Control 2006 Current Offensive
& Defensive Strategies in M&A Transactions, 1528 PLI/Corp 445 (2006). The Act includes a section
that requires attorneys to act as follows:
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primary focus from the most basic of issues, shareholder rights, to the
seemingly more critical issues relating to financial disclosure by boards
of directors. 4 Although such fundamental changes were essential, corpo-
rate attorneys must not forget to give their continued attention to trans-
formations of basic shareholder voting rights. 5
Originating from a very simple and uncomplicated structure of in-
6dividual shareholder voting, shareholder voting in general has evolved
and developed into a more detailed system that can involve shareholders
voting as a separate "voting group." 7 Many of the older corporate law
cases often dealt only with the procedural issues of individual share-
holder voting. 8 In contrast, modern courts apply a more developed analy-
sis in determining when shareholders of particular classes or series of
stock are entitled to vote as voting groups. 9 Although this Comment will
not comprehensively examine how courts and legislatures in all states
have transformed their shareholder voting rights, this Comment will fo-
cus on the various stages in Washington's transformation to shareholder
voting rights. One recent stage in Washington's shareholder voting oc-
curred when the Washington legislature amended the provision in the
[R]eport evidence of a material violation of securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or
similar violation by a company or agent thereof to the company's chief legal counsel or
CEO and, if the company executive does not respond appropriately, to the audit commit-
tee .... The rules also provide an alternative reporting system, allowing attorneys instead
to report the evidence to the board's qualified legal compliance committee ...which
would have the responsibility of conducting an investigation.
Id. at 468-69. Thus, although the Act may not directly regulate an attorney's direct hands-on in-
volvement as much as an accountant's involvement, the Act nevertheless will indirectly cause attor-
neys to watch the affairs of their corporate clients more closely and with more frequency.
4. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
5. The importance of shareholder voting lies in the fact that, as an incident of stock ownership,
a shareholder's right to vote is "among the most fundamental rights of the ownership of voting
shares." 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 850 (2004). Additionally, shareholder voting "has pri-
macy in the system of corporate governance because it is the ideological underpinning upon which
the legitimacy of directorial power rests." Id. Thus, to overlook the transformations to shareholder
voting is to overlook the delicate balance between the shareholder's ownership rights and the subse-
quently delegated directorial powers.
6. For an example of an uncomplicated structure of individual shareholder voting, see 1866
Wash. Sess. Laws 763.
7. For purposes of this Comment, a voting group is defined as "all shares of one or more
classes or series that under the articles of incorporation or [state statute] are entitled to vote and be
counted together collectively on a matter at a meeting of shareholders." WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 23B.01.400(34) (2005). Therefore, "[a]ll shares entitled by the articles of incorporation or [state
statute] to vote generally on the matter are for that purpose a single voting group." Id.
8. Examples of procedural issues include proper notice of the shareholder meeting or the
existence of a quorum.
9. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996), is an example of a more contemporary ana-
lytical approach that courts are now incorporating. See discussion infra Part IV.A. I.
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Washington Business Corporation Act pertaining to classes or series vot-
ing as separate voting groups.' 0
On July 27, 2003, the Washington legislature unanimously
amended Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 23B.10.040 of the Wash-
ington Business Corporation Act." This amendment to RCW
23B.10.040 2 contained not only technical and clarity changes, but also
10. The importance of class or series voting, now recognized in most jurisdictions as group
voting, is found in the fact that group voting "elevates the position of certain classes or series of
shareholders by giving a class or series of otherwise non-voting shareholders or shareholders with an
aggregate minority voting interest in the corporation a statutorily mandated veto power over a trans-
action." Philip S. Garon et al., Challenging Delaware's Desirability as a Haven for Incorporation,
32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 769, 798-99 (2006). Thus, minority shareholders are better able to pro-
tect their ownership interest in the corporation. See infra note 27.
11. Both chambers unanimously accepted and passed Senate Bill 5123. WA Votes, 2003 Reg.
Sess. S.B. 5123. In the Senate, the Bill passed with 46 Yeas, 0 Nays. Id. In the House, the Bill
passed with 95 Yeas, 0 Nays. Id.
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.10.040 (2003). The statute, hereinafter referred to as the
Amended Washington Act, reads as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise required by subsection (3) of this section or otherwise permitted
by subsection (4) of this section, the holders of the outstanding shares of a class or series
are entitled to vote as a separate voting group on a proposed amendment if shareholder
voting is otherwise required by this title and if the amendment would:
(a) Increase the aggregate number of authorized shares of the class or series;
(b) Effect an exchange or reclassification of all or part of the issued and out-
standing shares of the class or series into shares of another class or series,
thereby adversely affecting the holders of the shares so exchanged or reclassi-
fied;
(c) Change the rights, preferences, or limitations of all or part of the issued
and outstanding shares of the class or series, thereby adversely affecting the
holders of shares of the class or series;
(d) Change all or part of the issued and outstanding shares of the class or se-
ries into a different number of shares of the same class or series, thereby ad-
versely affecting the holders of shares of the class or series;
(e) Create a new class or series of shares having rights or preferences with re-
spect to distributions or to dissolution that are, or upon designation by the
board of directors in accordance with RCW 23B.06.020 may be, prior, supe-
rior, or substantially equal to the shares of the class or series;
(f) Increase the rights or preferences with respect to distributions or to dissolu-
tion, or the number of authorized shares of any class or series that, after giving
effect to the amendment, has rights or preferences with respect to distributions
or to dissolution that are, or upon designation by the board of directors in ac-
cordance with RCW 23B.06.020 may be, prior, superior, or substantially
equal to the shares of the class or series;
(g) Limit or deny an existing preemptive right of all or part of the shares of the
class or series;
(h) Cancel or otherwise adversely affect rights to distributions or dividends
that have accumulated but not yet been declared on all or part of the shares of
the class or series; or
(i) Effect a redemption or cancellation of all or part of the shares of the class
or series in exchange for cash or any other form of consideration other than
shares of the corporation.
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substantive changes carrying important ramifications for the develop-
ment of Washington's corporate law. Many of these changes have altered
Washington's philosophy of minority shareholder voting rights as sepa-
rate voting groups. As a result, minority shareholder voting groups now
are not afforded the same liberal protections that previously existed in
Washington's corporate laws and those groups may find it much more
problematic in protecting their economic investments in Washington
corporations.
This Comment explores Washington's changing philosophy of
shareholder voting and how the current developments to Washington's
corporate law have impacted shareholder voting group rights. In light of
Washington's corporate law history, the underlying reasons for the
amendments, and case law, this Comment argues that the recent amend-
ments have altered, rather than preserved, what has been historically the
true philosophy underlying Washington corporate law: minority share-
holder rights. Part II of this Comment tracks the evolution of voting
group rights through past Washington law and until the present Washing-
ton Business Corporation Act. Part III discusses the underlying reasons
for the amendments, addresses the specific clarity and substantive revi-
sions to the statute, and compares and contrasts the current amendment
with the current Delaware General Corporate Law counterpart. Part IV
analyzes relevant cases from jurisdictions that have patterned their cor-
porate law after both Delaware's corporate law and the Model Business
(2) If a proposed amendment would affect only a series of a class of shares in one or
more of the ways described in subsection (1) of this section, only the shares of that series
are entitled to vote as a separate voting group on the proposed amendment. A voting
group entitled to vote separately under this section may never comprise a group of hold-
ers smaller than the holders of a single class or series authorized and designated as a class
or series in the articles of incorporation, unless otherwise provided in the articles of in-
corporation or unless the board of directors conditions its submission of the proposed
amendment on a separate vote by one or more smaller voting groups.
(3) If a proposed amendment, that would otherwise entitle two or more classes or series
of shares to vote as separate voting groups under this section, would affect those two or
more classes or series in the same or substantially similar way, then instead of voting as
separate voting groups the shares of all similarly affected classes or series shall vote to-
gether as a single voting group on the proposed amendment, unless otherwise provided in
the articles of incorporation or unless the board of directors conditions its submission of
the proposed amendment on a separate vote by one or more classes or series.
(4) A class or series of shares is entitled to the voting group rights granted by this section
although the articles of incorporation generally describe the shares of the class or series
as nonvoting shares. The articles of incorporation may, however, limit or deny the voting
group rights granted by subsection (1)(a), (e), or (f) of this section as to any class or se-
ries of issued or unissued shares, by means of a provision that makes explicit reference to
the limitation or denial of voting group rights that would otherwise apply under subsec-
tion (I)(a), (e), or (f) of this section.
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Corporation Act. Part V argues that the recent amendments have conse-
quently altered Washington's original philosophy underlying voting
groups. Finally, Part VI proposes that the legislature should amend the
provision again to conform to Washington's original philosophy.
II. EVOLUTION OF VOTING GROUP RIGHTS UNDER
THE WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
To analyze the transformation of voting group rights under RCW
23B.10.040 more effectively, especially in light of the recent amend-
ments, this article looks to the development of Washington's voting
group rights during four periods of time in Washington's corporate law:
(1) pre-1933 session laws and statutes; (2) 1933 to 1965 amendments and
new statutes; (3) 1965 to 1989 amendments; and (4) post-1989 amend-
ments up through the current revisions.' 3 This section looks at the rights
voting groups enjoyed, if any, for each respective time period, addresses
how these rights changed through subsequent amendments, and notes
important insights into the legislative intent underlying voting groups.
A. Washington's Non-Existent Voting Groups-Pre-1933
Washington's first set of statutory corporate laws, enacted on Janu-
ary 27, 1866,14 reflected more basic and more simplistic mechanics for
corporate governance than one finds in today's corporate analog. 5 For
example, the original statute neither specifically nor literally mentioned
per se "amendments" of the certificates or articles of incorporation. 16
Rather, the language established an uncomplicated procedure by which a
corporation could increase or decrease its capital stock.' 7 And despite
subsequent revisions to other sections of the 1866 statute, the same gen-
eral statutory language for increasing and decreasing capital stock re-
mained for nearly forty years.' 8 As codified, Washington's first corporate
law provisions that pertained to "amending" the articles of incorporation
13. As will become clear through the subsequent analysis sections of the article, this break-
down indicates when the more critical or drastic changes and transformations to Washington's
corporate law occurred.
14. 1866 Wash. Sess. Laws 763.
15. Compare supra note 14 (incorporating simplistic procedures to increase or decrease stock),
with supra note 12 (incorporating a more delineated structure of situations for voting groups).
16. 1866 Wash. Sess. Laws 768.
17. If a corporation wanted to increase or decrease its capital stock, a stockholder meeting was
required to be held by giving notice "signed by at least a majority of trustees, and published at least
eight weeks in some newspaper. .. specify[ing] the object of the meeting, the time and place where
it [was] to be held, and the amount to which it [was] proposed to [change] the capital, and a vote of
two-thirds of all the shares of stock." Id.
18. Compare 1879 Wash. Sess. Laws 155 (using the same language as in supra note 17), with
1899 Wash. Sess. Laws 174 (maintaining the exact same language as the codified version).
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utilized language relating primarily to procedural aspects of corporate
governance rather than to substantive shareholder rights. 19 Important to
note, however, was the supermajority vote, rather than a mere majority
vote, required for increasing or decreasing the corporation's capital.20
Thus, in terms of shareholder voting rights, the legislature was concerned
very early that Washington's corporate law needed to provide sharehold-
ers with at least some means of protecting their economic interests in the
corporation.
Minor technical changes to the statute occurred in 1905 when the
legislature revisited its corporate laws and integrated language that
resembles more contemporary rhetoric. 21 This change in statutory lan-
guage constituted the basis for corporations to "amend" 22 their articles of
incorporation for over the next twenty-five years.23 However, despite the
relative usefulness and unproblematic nature of these changes, 24 the leg-
islature became interested in other significant changes being proposed to
19. The author opines that the statutory requirement of providing notice in the newspaper of
the meeting time and place was a procedural technicality rather than an indication of a substantive
shareholder right to vote. See 1879 Wash. Sess. Laws 155. But, as stated in the discussion above, the
important element to the statute was the required supermajority vote. Id. Thus, shareholders, particu-
larly minority shareholders, concerned with increases or decreases to the corporation's capital would
likely have found much desired protection in the clause requiring a supermajority vote rather than a
mere majority.
20. See 1879 Wash. Sess. Laws 155. Supermajority voting was an important means of protect-
ing minority shareholder interests, and this concept became prevalent during the late 1970s and early
1980s when corporate mergers and acquisitions dominated U.S. equity markets. See Brett W. King,
The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority Rule, Corporate Legiti-
macy, and Minority Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 918 (1996). For an excellent
discussion of the history and evolution of majority voting into supermajority voting, see id.
21. The statutory language utilized the literal term "amendments" in describing changes that
can be made to the articles of incorporation, provided a similar procedure by which the articles can
be amended, and eliminated the requirement of providing notice through a newspaper. See 1905
Wash. Sess. Laws 28.
22. As suggested in the discussion, the integration of the term "amend" was relatively minor.
See discussion supra Part II.A. The author hypothesizes that the purpose for this technical change
was to comport with language becoming more common in other states' corporate laws and being
used more often by corporate attorneys and courts. Additionally, with the exception of the deletion
of providing notice through the newspaper, no substantive changes were made to the provision. See
supra note 21.
23. Compare 1905 Wash. Sess. Laws 28 (supra note 21), with 1915 Wash. Sess. Laws 273
(making no changes to the relevant amendatory language), and 1923 Wash. Sess. Laws 541 (retain-
ing the exact same amendatory language), and REV. STAT. OF WASH. ANN. § 3805 (1932) (making
no changes in the amendatory language).
24. For the time during which this statute was in force, only two cases were ever disputed: first,
in First Nat. Bank of Everett v. Wilcox, 72 Wash. 473, 131 P. 203 (1913), the Supreme Court ordered
a corporation to amend its articles of incorporation to include the change in residence, and then to
file the amended articles; and second, in Tull & Gibbs v. Hinckle, 130 Wash. 571, 228 P. 599 (1924),
the Supreme Court resolved a dispute concerning the filing fee for a corporation that had increased
the corporation's capital stock. Thus, neither case involved issues relating to a shareholder's substan-
tive rights, that is, ownership of stock or right to vote.
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corporate law on a national level; 25 changes that would pave the way for
Washington's meaningful introductions to and eventual alterations in
voting group laws enacted between 1933 and 1965.
B. Class Voting: Washington's Initial Transformation
for Voting Group Rights-1933 to 1965
In 1933, Washington took its first transitioning steps toward recog-
nizing more liberal substantive shareholder voting rights by passing the
Washington Uniform Business Corporation Act (Washington Uniform
Act).26 The passage of the Washington Uniform Act was not only an ef-
fort to follow "the trend toward liberalization and modernization," 27 but
also an attempt to promote the concept of a uniform corporate law
throughout all states. 28 Consistent with the idea of liberalizing and mod-
ernizing Washington's corporate law, the Washington Uniform Act rec-
ognized situations in which minority shareholders would actually be
permitted to vote as a separate voting class, 29 even though they were not
normally entitled to vote.30 Also, in addition to maintaining the two-
thirds supermajority vote for shareholder voting in general, the Washing-
ton Uniform Act required that "the holders of two-thirds of the shares of
each class so affected by the amendment [was necessary]" for the
amendment to pass.3 ' Consequently, the combination of "class voting"
and a supermajority vote would serve as a basis for protecting minority
25. These changes originated with the Uniform Business Corporation Act (Uniform Act), an
act drafted and promulgated in 1928 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. However, the Uniform Act was subsequently incorporated by only three other states:
Louisiana (1929), Idaho (1929), and Kentucky (1946). See John Richard Steincipher, Comment, The
Model Business Corporation Act-"An Appropriate Starting Place, " 38 WASH. L. REV. 539 (1963).
Any other subsequent changes are addressed in the textual analysis of this Comment below.
26. See 1933 Wash. Sess. Laws 799; REV. WASH. CODE § 23.01 (1933). For an example of the
text involved with these changes, see infra note 30.
27. Steincipher, supra note 25.
28. Washington's assistance came in the form of patterning the Washington Uniform Business
Corporation Act (Washington Uniform Act) after the Uniform Act. See Steincipher, supra note 25.
29. Class voting allows minority shareholders, usually the holders of preferred stock, to "obtain
control over certain decisions of the corporation typically made by the board." See Kelly Kunsch,
Capitalization and Stock-Voting Rights, lB WASH. PRAC. SERIES § 66.29 (2005). Since minority
shareholders are thus empowered with a "veto power," the majority shareholders are usually re-
quired to overcome that veto power by an "affirmative vote of a majority of the shares of each class
of stock, voting as a class." See id.
30. The Washington Uniform Act recognized two situations where non-voting shareholders
were entitled to vote as a separate class: first, when the amendment "would make any change in the
rights of the holders of shares of any class"; and second, when the amendment authorized shares
"with preferences in any respect superior to those of outstanding shares of any class." 1933 Wash.
Sess. Laws 799.
31. REM. REV. STAT. OF WASH. § 3803-37 (Supp. 1940) (emphasis added) (repealed 1965).
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shareholders in Washington for the next thirty plus years.32 Thus, this
stage in Washington's changing corporate law became extremely signifi-
cant because the legislature statutorily recognized that minority share-
holders needed not only previously codified procedural protections, but
also newly codified substantive protections in the form of class voting.33
However, the transformation to Washington's corporate law was far
from over. Although not a complete failure in terms of modernizing cor-
porate law, the Uniform Act failed to produce the desired uniformity
throughout the states.34 Therefore, most states, including Washington,
began seeking assistance and direction from other national sources.
35
Such assistance became the basis for Washington's changes to the Wash-
ington Uniform Act.3 6 These changes eventually not only led to the more
current organization and language of the statute, but also to the
subsequent protection for minority shareholder voting rights.
37
C. Further Development to Class Voting in Washington-1965 to 1989
In 1965, the legislature once again revisited Washington's corpo-
rate law 38 and subsequently enacted the Washington Business Corpora-
tion Act,39 which began the next stage of Washington's corporate law.
32. Compare 1933 Wash. Sess. Laws 799 (introducing the concept of voting as a class), with
1965 Wash. Sess. Laws 1104 (changing the organization and expanding the situations for when
shareholders are entitled to vote as a separate class).
33. This recognition can be plainly observed by noticing the changes from the previous statute
to the Washington Uniform Act. For example, whereas the Washington Uniform Act required a two-
thirds supermajority vote for amendments other than to change the corporation's name, the previous
statute required only a mere majority. See Leslie J. Ayer, The New Washington Business Corpora-
tion Act, 9 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1934). Accordingly, and as stated in the discussion above, the Wash-
ington Uniform Act incorporated the two-thirds supermajority vote into the requirements for an
amendment to pass when class voting was involved. See id.
34. Because the Uniform Act was not accepted by most states, the Commissioners for the
Uniform Act withdrew it as a "uniform act" in 1943 and renamed it the "Model Business Corpora-
tion Act." During the development of the Uniform Act, however, the American Bar Association
(ABA) was developing its own version of a model business corporation act, which, once released,
rapidly gained acceptance by many states. As a result of the widespread acceptance of the ABA's
version, the Uniform Act was withdrawn entirely in 1958, and states have since then recognized the
ABA's version as the "Model Business Corporation Act" (Model Act). See Robert W. Hamilton,
Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1457 (1985).
35. See supra note 34.
36. Two particular changes that were incorporated into the new law included (1) a complete
restructuring of the law, and (2) a delineating of the individual situations when shareholders of a
particular class can vote as a separate voting class. See 1965 Wash. Sess. Laws 1104.
37. See infra note 40.
38. 1965 Wash. Sess. Laws 1053; WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.10.040 (hereinafter referred to as
the Washington Act).
39. The Washington Act was passed by a unanimous 89 to 0 vote in the House and with a 45 to
I vote in the Senate. See Richard 0. Kummert, The Financial Provisions of the New Washington
Business Corporation Act, 41 WASH. L. REV. 207 n.l (1966).
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Incorporating the language, organization, and underlying purposes of the
then recently written Model Act (promulgated by the American Bar As-
sociation),40 the Washington Act not only described instances when a
corporation may amend its articles of incorporation, 4 1 but also enumer-
ated ten specific circumstances when shareholders of a class affected by
such an amendment were automatically entitled to vote on the amend-
ment as a separate class.42 Thus, in terms of shareholder class voting,
these amendments laid the foundation for granting necessary protection
to minority shareholders while not interfering with the board's corporate
management.43
As a complement to the legislature's improvement of Washington's
business corporation laws, the Washington State Bar Association Busi-
ness Law Section organized the Corporate Act Revision Committee
(CARC) in 1975.44 CARC assisted with developing Washington's corpo-
rate law principally by "recommending appropriate amendments in re-
sponse to changes in the Model Act and other states' corporate laws. 45
40. Because the Washington legislature adopted the Model Act nearly verbatim as the govern-
ing corporate law for Washington, some historical and explanatory information about the Model Act
is necessary. The Model Act was first prepared in 1943 and was later published in 1950 by the
Committee on Corporate Law of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
American Bar Association (Model Act Committee). See Steincipher, supra note 25. It is important to
note for this particular time period in Washington's transformation of corporate law that later revi-
sions or addenda to the Model Act came in 1953, 1957, 1959, 1962, and 1964. See Kummert, supra
note 39, at 208 n.3. Revisions or addendums to the Model Act occurring after 1965 are discussed
below. See infra note 47.
The Model Act was originally meant to provide a working model for state commissions and bar
association committees in order to revise and modernize their corporate laws more easily. The
Model Act Committee believed that a carefully planned and moderate pattern would alleviate a large
amount of labor and research on the part of local groups everywhere. Thus, the Model Act Commit-
tee sought to use "simplicity and clarity of expression, concise and consistent use of terms, stan-
dardization of procedure, and plain and precise language." See Ray Garrett, Preface to the 1950
Revision of MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (REVISED 1953), at iv-v (1953).
Additionally, noting that shareholder rights in some states' corporate laws were treated too loosely
or were entirely non-existent, the Model Act Committee devoted a great deal of consideration to
strengthen, rather than to weaken, and to more clearly define, shareholder rights. In particular, the
Model Act Committee reiterated its position on shareholder voting in the preface to the 1953 revi-
sion, that when an amendment to the articles of incorporation alters "the rights, preferences, and the
relative status of the shares of any class, the shares of that class are entitled to vote as a class regard-
less of the articles." See id. at vi. Furthermore, the Model Act Committee believed in the preserva-
tion of minority representation in all circumstances, not to be left to the decision of promoters who
"might destroy it by omission or declaration in the charter." See id. at iv-v.
41. See 1965 Wash. Sess. Laws 1101.
42. See id. at 1104.
43. This approach was another idea underlying the Model Act. See supra note 40.
44. CORPORATE ACT REVISION COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
(RCW 23B) SOURCEBOOK, at v (2005) [hereinafter WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK].
45. Id. When the Corporate Act Revision Committee (CARC) convenes to address Washing-
ton's corporate laws, the committee members invite several practicing attorneys who then discuss
the prevailing issues in their respective practices and answer questions posed by the CARC commit-
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In 1984, CARC became aware of important revisions to the Model Act46
and proposed that similar changes be made to Washington's shareholder
voting rights provisions. 47  Interestingly, none of CARC's proposed
changes suggested altering the underlying purpose of providing share-
holders with protections to their voting group rights.48 Thus, shareholders
tee members. Telephone Interview with John Steel, Principal, Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich, in
Seattle, Wa. (Dec. 28, 2005). Thus, by using this approach, CARC can more effectively and effi-
ciently address the most current and problematic issues of Washington's corporate law. Id.
46. Returning to the history of the Model Act, one notices that since 1964, revisions to the
Model Act have been scarce (with supplements in 1968 and 1977). See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT xvii-xviii (1984). However, in 1971 the ABA released a new annotated version of the Model
Business Corporation Act that included crucial commentary relating to class voting. See MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 264 (1971). With this release, the ABA adopted the philosophy that a class
"should have voting rights on any amendment of the articles that would materially affect that class."
Id. Additionally, "[i]t [was] not a prerequisite to such voting rights that the proposed amendment
would have an adverse affect on the holders of the class, or any of them." Id. (emphasis in original).
Furthermore, "[t]he voting rights exist[ed] if the proposed amendment would affect the class in ways
specifically enumerated even if the effect is advantageous to the holders of the class." Id.
In 1984, the ABA released a Revised Model Business Corporation Act (Revised Model Act),
which replaced the original Model Act. Like the original Model Act, the Revised Model Act acted as
a guide for states to revise their own corporate laws. At the time it was released, the Revised Model
Act was adopted in substance by about thirty-five states, and other portions have been adopted or
followed by other states. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT xvii-xviii (1984).
Important to note with the Revised Model Act in 1984 is the introduction of the concept of "vot-
ing groups" rather than the traditional rhetoric of voting as classes. Additionally, the Revised Model
Act included three new subsections that began to define more clearly some of the instances in which
shareholders would be permitted to vote as separate voting groups, but also clarified that some
shareholders are entitled to vote as separate voting groups even if the articles of incorporation de-
scribe those shares as nonvoting.
Of particular importance is the ABA's underlying intent in making these revisions. The Revised
Model Act recognized that "[t]he right to vote as a separate voting group provides a majorprotection
for classes or series of shares with preferential rights or classes or series limited or nonvoting shares
against amendments that are especially burdensome to that class." See id. at 275 (emphasis added).
This philosophy was consistent with the 1971 annotated version that clearly avoided using an ad-
verse effect qualification. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 264 (1971).
The Revised Model Act was subsequently either revised or supplemented further in 1987 (changes
dealing with distributions to shareholders and liability for unlawful distributions), 1988 (changes
dealing with directors' conflicting interest transactions), 1990 (changes dealing with limitations of
director liability, derivative proceedings, and flexibility and certainty to non-public corporations),
1994 (major changes to the indemnification provisions), 1996 (changes dealing with shareholder
meetings and shareholder voting generally), 1997 (changes pertaining to electronic filing), 1998
(changes dealing with standards of conduct for directors and officers, and also with shareholder and
director inspection rights and notices), 1999 (changes dealing with appraisal rights, fundamental
changes that affect voting powers, and share issuance), 2000 and 2001 (changes to sections dealing
with directors and officers, and dissolutions), and 2002 (changes dealing with the use of extrinsic
facts for shares and options, and domestication and conversion). See I MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
ANN. xxxi-xliii (2005). None of these revisions or supplements altered the underlying intent for the
voting group provisions: to serve as a major protection for classes or series of shares with preferen-
tial rights or classes or series of limited or nonvoting shares against amendments that are especially
burdensome to that class. See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT xvii-xviii (1984).
47. Supra note 44.
48. See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT xvii-xviii (1984). See also supra note 44.
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continued to enjoy the safeguards that Washington's corporate laws had
previously afforded them.
D. The Most Recent Transformation. From Class
Voting to Voting Groups-i 989 to the Present
Between 1989 and 1990, the legislature again revisited Washing-
ton's corporate law 4 9 and enacted a new Washington Business Corpora-
tion Act,50 marking the beginning of Washington's most recent alteration
to voting group rights. The New Washington Act acknowledged and
adopted what previous legislatures had already perceived: 51 that the
"right to vote as a separate voting group provides a major protection for
classes or series of shares with preferential rights or classes or series of
limited or nonvoting shares against amendments that are especially bur-
densome52 to that class. ' 53 In clarifying the term burdensome, the legisla-
ture stated that "the right to vote by separate voting group[s is not]
dependant on an evaluation of whether the amendment is detrimental to
the class or series.,5 4 Furthermore, despite the fact that "the question [of]
whether an amendment is detrimental is often a question of judgment,
[the] approval by the affected class or series is required, irrespective of
whether the board or other shareholders believe it is beneficial or detri-
mental to the affected class or series. 55 Thus, the inclusion and defini-
tion of the word "burdensome ', 56 in the statute suggests that it was ini-
tially enacted to provide a more liberal and expansive means for minority
49. REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT xvii-xviii (1984). See generally Washington State Bar
Association Legislative Committee, Minutes of Nov. H1, 2002, http://www.wsba.org/info/operations/
legislative/I 1802minuteswsbalegislativecommittee.doc.
50. For an excellent discussion of the specific changes made to the Washington Business Cor-
poration Act at that time (New Washington Act), see John Maurice, The 1990 Washington Business
Corporation Act, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 373, 423-26 (1990).
51. See WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-3 cmt.
52. Although the term "burdensome" is introduced by the Model Act's underlying philosophy
for the first time in 1984, see REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT xvii-xviii (1984), the more liberal
nature of the term indicates an intent by the ABA to continue providing a source of "major protec-
tion" for minority shareholders. Id. Thus, the underlying purpose from the 1971 annotated version of
the Model Act was not discounted, and the ABA saw fit to continue providing this protection to
shareholder voting rights in the 1984 Revised Model Act. Id.
53. WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-3 cmt. (emphasis added).
54. Id. This language suggests a similar underlying purpose to that incorporated and promul-
gated by the ABA in the 1971 annotated version of the Model Business Corporation Act. See supra
note 46.
55. WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-3 cmt.
56. Webster's defines the term "burdensome" as "being or imposing a burden." WEBSTER'S II
NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 147 (3d ed. 1995). The term "burden" is defined as "to weigh down."
Id. Synonymous with the term "burden" is the term "oppress," meaning "to persecute or subjugate
by unjust use of force or authority." Id. at 769.
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shareholders to protect their economic interests in the corporation rather
than to impose restrictions on shareholders. 57
Although the New Washington Act is aligned with Washington
corporate law's historical purpose of protecting minority shareholder
interests, the most recent amendments have actually altered Washing-
ton's corporate law to the point that shareholders that would historically
be entitled to vote as voting groups now have even more restrictions and
limitations placed on their voting rights. Consequently, these amend-
ments have placed minority shareholders in a more difficult position to
protect their economic interests in the corporation, which is contrary to
Washington's historically liberal corporate laws.
III. THE 2003 AMENDMENT
As a result of the specific changes to RCW 23B.10.040, Washing-
ton's corporate laws have now conformed more closely to other states'
corporate laws but have consequently altered Washington's philosophy
regarding voting groups' voting on proposed amendments to the articles
of incorporation. An understanding of how these recent amendments
have altered Washington's philosophy of shareholder voting group rights
requires an appreciation of: (1) the legislature's underlying reasons for
the recent changes; (2) the revised subsections in their respective order;
and (3) the differences and similarities between Washington's current
revisions and the Delaware General Corporate Law counterpart.
A. Underlying Reasons for the Changes
The recent amendments were passed for two primary reasons. First,
corporate attorneys wanted more substantive and technical clarification
to the ambiguous portions of the provision. 58 And second, in light of
added corporate flexibility in other jurisdictions, 59 CARC recommended
a reevaluation of Washington's lack of a provision60 that would allow a
corporation to "opt out '61 of certain voting rights.
57. This inclusion, therefore, also suggests a philosophy that is more consistent with Washing-
ton's historical philosophy of providing more liberal protections for shareholder voting rights.
58. Telephone Interview with John Steel, Principal, Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich LLP, in
Seattle, Wa. (Dec. 28, 2005). See also Washington State Bar Association Legislative Committee,
Minutes of Nov. 11, 2002, http://www.wsba.org/info/operations/legislative/lI 802minuteswsba
legislativecommittee.doc.
59. In determining these recent changes, CARC looked to several other states' corporate laws,
including New York, Illinois, California, and Delaware. Telephone Interview with John Steel, Prin-
cipal, Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich LLP, in Seattle, Wa. (Dec. 28, 2005).
60. See Washington State Bar Association Legislative Committee, Minutes of Nov. 11, 2002,
http://www.wsba.org/info/operations/legislative/I 1802minuteswsbalegislativecommittee.doc.
61. An "opt out" provision in effect permits a corporation to disregard the statutory default
rules for voting group treatment and instead design its own customized requirements for shareholder
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2007] Curbing Shareholder Voting Groups 1075
1. Substantive and Technical Clarification for Corporate Attorneys
Corporate attorneys looking at the statutory language wanted more
clarification for two primary reasons: first, attorneys were confused by
the ambiguity of some substantive portions of the statute and would con-
sequently interpret the statute incorrectly.62 Second, corporate lawyers
noticed internal inconsistencies and overlap among provisions within the
statute, particularly the provisions regarding amendments to the articles
of incorporation and mergers and acquisitions.63
CARC responded to these concerns by incorporating the phrase
"adverse effect" to replace the more liberal phrase "burdensome., 64 This
change was perhaps the most detrimental to Washington's underlying
philosophy for voting groups because of the very restrictive nature of the
term "adverse effect," which required a showing of hostility toward or
injurious effect on the shareholder.65 In contrast, the more liberal term
"burdensome" required that the shareholder show only that his or her
right would be encumbered.66 Nevertheless, in clarifying its reasons for
approval. See id. None of Washington's prior Business Corporation Acts had an option for corpora-
tions to "opt out" of the statutorily imposed shareholder approval requirements. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 23B.10.040 (1990), amended by 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 232-34.
62. For example, CARC received six reports of instances where attorneys were interpreting the
statute incorrectly in the following situation: if a corporation wanted to amend the terms of a Series
A preferred stock, then as long as the Series A stock got those terms the corporation did not need the
vote of all the shareholders. Telephone Interview with John Steel, Principal, Gray Cary Ware &
Freidenrich LLP, in Seattle, Wa. (Dec. 28, 2005). This interpretation was erroneous. Id. But enough
attorneys had interpreted the statute in this manner that more clarification was required. Id.
Another example of the ambiguity within the statute involved instances where attorneys were con-
cemed that when "only part of a class or series was affected by an amendment, the affected share-
holders might be entitled to vote separately on the amendment even though they represented a group
that was smaller than the whole class or series .. .[T]his ambiguity was [subsequently] removed
[and] amended." Landefeld et al., WASHINGTON CORPORATE LAW: CORPORATIONS AND LLCs
§ 9.11 (Supp. 2004).
63. One example involved early stage companies (particularly out-of-state venture capital
funds investing in local companies). Telephone Interview with John Steel, Principal, Gray Cary
Ware & Freidenrich LLP, in Seattle, Wa. (Dec. 28, 2005). Money from these investors would come
in and lawyers would negotiate investment terms. Id. Included in these terms were provisions involv-
ing circumstances where investors, as holders of stock, were entitled to a veto. Id. The question then
arose as to who had the veto power over a merger. Id. The advice given by Washington attorneys
was that, in addition to a general veto power, common stockholders also had a specific veto power
for a variety of other reasons (relying on the amendments to articles of incorporation provision). Id.
Consequently, the out-of-state investors expressed shock over the common stockholders having a
veto power that could essentially block a merger. Id.
64. See supra note 12; see also discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
65. Adverse is defined as hostile or injurious, or contrary or in opposition (to). See THE
OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 15 (1999); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 58
(8th ed. 2004).
66. The verb form of "burden" is also defined as encumbering. See THE OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 123 (1999); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 208 (8th ed. 2004).
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this particular substantive change, CARC commented that this "adverse
effect" qualification is "utilized to varying degrees by several other
states[,]" 67 and "despite the apparent subjectivity of the concept, it is no
more subjective than many statutory phrases found elsewhere in RCW
Ch. 23B, including the references to 'substantially similar' effects in the
existing voting group provisions. 68 Thus, in "keeping up" with other
jurisdictions, Washington's new corporate law not only disregards Wash-
ington's historical philosophy of more liberal protections, but it also
introduces a new shareholder voting philosophy that more severely re-
stricts voting group rights, despite the apparent ambiguity of the phrase
"adverse effect."
Unlike CARC's reasons for the substantive changes, CARC's rea-
sons for the technical modifications actually suggest that they were try-
ing to include even more liberal protections for shareholder voting
groups. In addition to explaining that these technical changes provided
much needed clarity to the general statutory framework, 69 CARC empha-
sized that the changes provide further clarity for previously confusing
situations involving a part of a series or class that is affected by the pro-
posed amendments.7 ° Ironically, these technical changes actually provide
for more liberal protections and are more akin to the protections that
Washington's previous corporate law once afforded its shareholders.
2. More Corporate Flexibility
On its own initiative, CARC proposed changes that now give cor-
porations added flexibility and control over voting group rights, resulting
in a drastic change to Washington's traditional philosophy of voting
group rights. To further clarify its reasons, CARC commented that "the
... changes recognize[d] that, consistent with the broadly permissive
philosophy of [the Revised Code of Washington] Ch[apter] 23B, corpo-
rations should be given flexibility in appropriate circumstances to limit
Thus, the adjective form "burdensome" necessarily means that someone or something is encum-
bered.
67. WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-5 history and committee cmt.
68. Id.
69. Id This clarity has also been recognized by practitioners. See Stephan H. Coonrod, Wash-
ington Business Corporation Act Amendments: Shareholder Voting Group Rights, Shareholder
Notice Requirements and Stock Splits (April 18, 2003), http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/
Detail.aspx?publication=3460.
70. See WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-5 history and committee cmt.
The changes are more liberal. When even a part of a series or class is affected by the proposed
amendment, the entire series or class is entitled to vote. See discussion infra Part 111.B.2.
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or even deny group voting rights relative to certain amendments. '1
CARC also noted:
[b]y permitting such rights to be limited or denied in the articles of
incorporation, the ... changes treat group voting similarly to pre-
emptive rights, cumulative voting, the right to vote on future pre-
ferred stock preferences, and a variety of other shareholder rights
that may be denied or limited in the articles by the incorporators, or
subsequently by shareholders' approval of an amendment to the
articles.72
With an understanding of the underlying purposes for the changes,
we can now look to the specific modifications and the ways they changed
Washington's philosophy regarding shareholder voting group rights.
B. Changes to the Statute
1. Section One
In addition to a technical change, section one also contains impor-
tant substantive changes that have altered previous protections to share-
holder voting group rights.73 Seven distinct changes are found in section
one. To begin, the technical change consisted of the addition of the
words "or series" ' 74 interspersed throughout the section and in conjunc-
tion with the term "class., 75 This change conformed this section with
other sections of the New Washington Act and with similar changes to
other sections of this particular provision.
The substantive changes, however, created more drastic changes to
Washington's underlying voting group philosophy. First, the addition of
71. WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-5 history & committee cmt. Al-
though the Model Act and Revised Model Act have been somewhat permissive in allowing corpora-
tions flexibility in running the affairs of the corporation, they nevertheless have required and af-
forded major protections to shareholder voting rights that are less restrictive than the Amended
Washington Corporation Act, as indicated in their underlying purposes. See supra note 40; supra
note 46.
72. Id. CARC has justified these changes on the grounds that "shareholders will either become
aware of such a limitation or denial in the articles before they acquire their shares, or will be given
the opportunity to vote on any amendment that withdraws or limits their group voting rights after
their shares have been issued." Id. However, CARC has assumed that "[a]s with other statutory
language, legal counsel will presumably advise corporate clients to withhold voting group rights
only in cases where it is clear that there is no potential for harm to existing holders." Id.
73. See supra note 12.
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.I0.040(l)(a)-(l)(h) (2003).
75. Prior to the change, the statute employed only the term "class" when discussing the author-
ized shares that would be allowed to vote as separate voting groups upon proposed amendments to
the articles of incorporation. Id.
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the "adversely affected" clause 76 throughout the provision now requires
that shares of classes or series only "adversely affected" by the proposed
amendment may vote as a separate voting group. 7 Next, the legislature
deleted one entire circumstance when shareholders were previously al-
lowed to vote as separate voting groups. 78 In addition, the legislature in-
serted an entirely new subsection that appears to provide for more share-
holder protections. 79 Also, the legislature added language that recognized
voting rights for voting groups when the amendment creates new shares
or increases the rights of certain shares when directors could, in accor-
dance with RCW section 23B.06.020, create or designate such shares as
preferential or superior.80 Further, the legislature placed some potential
exceptions at the beginning of section one, whereby shareholders would
be required or permitted to vote as separate voting groups (this added
exception will be addressed in more detail below when discussing the
changes to sections three and four).8' And finally, the deletion of the
word "decrease" 82 from subsection (a) now limits shareholders to vote as
voting groups in this particular circumstance when the aggregate number
of shares of the class or series is increased, rather than either increased or
decreased.83
76. This change to section one is perhaps a more notably important change because of its in-
sight into the amendment's underlying purpose.
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.10.040()(a)-(l)(h) (2003).
78. Previously, shareholders were allowed to vote as separate voting groups when the amend-
ment would "effect an exchange or reclassification, or create the right of exchange, of all or part of
the shares of another class into shares of the class." See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.10.040(l)(a)-
(1)(h), (c) (1990), amended by Wash. Sess. Laws 232-34.
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.10.040(1)(i) (2003). This subsection was to account for and to
recognize voting group rights for cash outs of all or part of the shares of a class or series. See
WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-4 history & committee cmt. Thus, this new
subsection actually expands voting group rights by clarifying that when any part of a series or class
is going to be cashed out, then the entire series or class is entitled to vote as a voting group. See id. at
10.040-5. This new addition suggests, therefore, more protection for voting groups.
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.10.040(l)(e) (2003). This change was made to recognize that the
creation of a "new class of 'blank check' preferred stock, that may have prior, superior or substan-
tially equal dividend, redemption or liquidation preferences to those of existing holders, has a clear
potential for adverse affects and therefore gives rise to group voting at the time the 'blank-check'
stock is authorized." See WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-4 history & com-
mittee cmt. Thus, this change is "especially important since the eventual designation of new pre-
ferred series will be accomplished by Board action alone, and will note give rise to any shareholder
voting, let alone any voting by groups of shareholders." Id.
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.10.040(l) (2003).
82. Id. § 23B.10.040(l)(a).
83. This deletion is in direct contradiction to Washington's historical philosophy because prior
to this change "the voting rights exist[ed] if the proposed amendment would affect the class in any of
the ways specifically enumerated[,] even if the effect is advantageous to the holders of the class."
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 264 (1971). With the addition of the "adversely affect" clause, the
deletion of the term "decrease" is logical because "decreases in the size of a class or series hold little
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2. Section Two
Section two includes both substantive and technical changes relat-
ing to a situation where parts of a series are affected by proposed
amendments. Section two now clarifies that the "holders that may be en-
titled to vote separately are those that are formally authorized as classes
or designated as series in the articles of incorporation." 84 This change
helps to "eliminat[e] any ambiguity arising from the fact that specific
effects on 'part' of a class or series give rise to voting group treatment."
85
However, the section also now provides that corporations may opt out of
the statutorily imposed voting rights contained in this section.86 Thus,
although the new opt out provision gives corporations more flexibility,
these changes also provide minority shareholders with an added mecha-
nism with which to protect their ownership interests, and thereby add to
the liberal protections previously afforded shareholders.
3. Section Three
Four particular changes to section three signify a shift from Wash-
ington's previously liberal philosophy to the new restrictive philosophy.
First, the phrase "class or series" was added throughout this section in
order to align it more succinctly with the technical additions made to the
other sections.87 Second, the legislature added a small clause to clarify
when classes or series will vote separately, or when they will be com-
bined into one voting group.88 Third, a change in the term "must" to
"shall" now makes this provision more consistent with other provisions
throughout the New Washington Act.89 And finally, an "exception"
clause was tacked on at the end of the section disallowing similarly af-
fected classes or series to vote as separate voting groups "unless other-
wise provided in the articles of incorporation or unless the board of di-
rectors conditions its submission of the proposed amendment on a sepa-
rate vote by one or more classes or series., 90 Thus, although the changes
potential for harm to existing holders, and would not give rise to voting group rights."
WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-5 history & committee cmt.
84. WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-5 history & committee cmt. See
also supra note 12.
85. WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-5 history & committee cmt. This
ambiguity was removed and the statute was amended "to make clear that even when only a part of a
class or series is affected by an amendment, that part has no separate group voting right; rather, the
group that is entitled to vote separately on the amendment is comprised of holders of the entire class
or series." Landefeld et al., supra note 62, at § 9.11.
86. See supra note 12.
87. 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 234.
88. The exact clause states: "then instead of voting as separate voting groups." Id
89. Id. at 233-34.
90. Id. at 234.
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specifically suggest that "similarly affected classes [and] series should
normally be combined together into a single voting group,"9' these
changes have ultimately limited the shareholder voting group rights, have
expanded corporate flexibility, and have consequently resulted in a con-
tradiction to Washington's original philosophy of voting group rights.
4. Section Four
The technical changes to this section substantiate the legislature's
underlying purpose of providing more clarity, but the substantive
changes therein further alter Washington's shareholder voting philoso-
phy. As in most other sections, the addition of the clause "or series" cre-
ated more consistency and clarity throughout this provision when speak-
ing in terms of "classes or series. ' 92 However, a significant substantive
change to this section now affords corporations an option to opt out of
the statutorily imposed voting group rights, thereby providing corpora-
tions with more flexibility.93 This change consequently permits corpora-
tions to limit or deny in the articles of incorporation the voting group
rights that are in fact already granted by certain subsections in the provi-
sion.94 Thus, although the technical change aligns the language of this
section with the other sections in the provision, the substantive change
transforms Washington's historically liberal voting group philosophy
into a much more restrictive philosophy.
C. Differences and Similarities Between RCW 23B. 10. 040
and Delaware's General Corporate Law Counterpart
States develop their corporate laws from two general
bases95-either states adopt the Model Act provisions, or a derivation
thereof,96 or they adopt provisions similar to Delaware's corporate law.
97
91. WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK, supra note 44, at § 10.040-5 history & committee cmt.
92. 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 234.
93. This Comment will not focus on addressing or arguing this particular aspect of the substan-
tive changes. However, for a general discussion about default rules and opt-out options, see Sympo-
sium, Van Gorkom and the Corporate Board: Problem, Solution, or Placebo?, 96 Nw. U. L. REV.
489 (2002).
94. These sections pertain to circumstances when the amendment increases the aggregate num-
ber of shares, creates a new class or series with preferential rights, and increases the preferential
rights of classes or series of those shares. See supra note 12.
95. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY, MACEY ON CORPORATION LAWS § 7.04[B] (Supp.
2003).
96. Thirty-six jurisdictions have currently adopted and now follow the Revised Model Act,
either procedurally or substantively or both; only twelve states have opted to draft their own corpo-
rate laws. See id.
97. Only Kansas and Oklahoma have adopted Delaware's provision. See id. The relevant pro-
vision in Delaware's General Corporate Law states:
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A brief comparison between the substantive aspects" of Delaware's and
Washington's voting group rights99 emphasizes the fundamental change
in philosophy to Washington's voting group rights.
The statutory language of Delaware's and Washington's provisions
has traditionally suggested contrary philosophies underlying shareholder
voting group rights. 00 However, both statutes now contain more
The holders of the outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote as a class upon a
proposed amendment, whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of the cer-
tificate of incorporation, if the amendment would increase or decrease the aggregate
number of authorized shares of such class, increase or decrease the par value of the shares
of such class, or alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of
such class so as to affect them adversely. If any proposed amendment would alter or
change the powers, preferences, or special rights of I or more series of any class so as to
affect them adversely, but shall not so affect the entire class, then only the shares of the
series so affected by the amendment shall be considered a separate class for the purposes
of this paragraph. The number of authorized shares of any such class or classes of stock
may be increased or decreased (but not below the number of shares thereof then out-
standing) by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the stock of the corpora-
tion entitled to vote irrespective of the provisions of this subsection, if so provided in the
original certificate of incorporation, in any amendment thereto which created such class
or classes of stock or which was adopted prior to the issuance of any shares of such class
or classes of stock, or in any amendment thereto which was authorized by a resolution or
resolutions adopted by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of such class or
classes of stock.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2005).
98. Although the structural and organizational differences are apparent, and may not typically
indicate a difference in underlying philosophy, the author opines that the structural difference be-
tween these statutes is quite important in terms of Washington's underlying philosophy.
99. Although a complete historical account of Delaware's corporate law is outside the scope of
this Comment, a couple crucial changes to Delaware's corporate law are worth noting at this point.
The first involves the monumental decision of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. W.S. Dickey
Clay Manufacturing Co., 24 A.2d 315 (Del. 1942), because this holding was later codified to require
that the minority shareholders had to be adversely affected by the proposed amendment. See discus-
sion infra Part V.A. 1.
Another important change occurred in 1999 after the Delaware legislature amended the statute.
For the purposes of this Comment, it is very important to note the Delaware legislative intent in
making the change:
[T]o providefewer voting rights, of pure statutory origin, to members of nonstock corpo-
rations in the adoption of amendments to the certificate of incorporation; in sum, such
members have neither the rights to vote on an amendment generally nor a right to vote on
an amendment as a class member unless the certificate of incorporation provides other-
wise.
DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2005) (emphasis added). This change was apparently a direct
response to Farahpour v. DCX, Inc., 635 A.2d 894 (Del. 1994). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
242(b)(2) (2005). However, the important difference for purposes of this Comment is that the
Amended Washington Act does not involve instances for nonstock corporations, but rather for cor-
porations that issue stock as evidence of ownership rights and subsequent economic benefits.
100. Various opinions suggest that jurisdictions patterning their corporate law after the Model
Act are not substantially broader than Delaware's counterpart. See Philip S. Garon et al., Challeng-
ing Delaware's Desirability as a Haven for Incorporation, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 769, 799
(2006). However, the author is of the opinion that the enumeration of specific instances in which
shareholders automatically have a right to vote as a separate voting group implies a much broader
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substantively similar language l01 that implicates a fundamental change to
Washington's voting group philosophy. Both statutes now require that
proposed amendments "adversely affect"'' 0 2 a class or series before any
voting group rights are recognized. 10 3 Such a qualification, however, in-
fers a direct contradiction to Washington's historical approach of provid-
ing more liberal shareholder voting rights.'°4 Thus, both statutes advance
a restrictive philosophy with respect to permitting voting groups a right
to vote on proposed amendments.
However, two principal differences between the statutes suggest
that Washington's efforts to provide for more restrictive voting rights
were incomplete and have created an undesirable tension in the language.
First, unlike the nine specifically enumerated instances found in Wash-
ington's statute, 0 5 Delaware's statute permits shareholders to vote as
separate voting groups on a proposed amendment in only three specific
instances. 0 6 And second, Washington's provision requires a two-thirds
supermajority vote, °7 as opposed to Delaware's simple majority vote, 
°8
in order for the proposed amendment to pass. Thus, when viewed to-
gether, these similarities and differences between statutes actually create
philosophy of voting group rights than an arguable "catch-all" clause in Delaware's provision. See
id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2005).
101. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2005), with WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23B.10.040 (2003).
102. The author is of the opinion that the phrase "adversely affect" connotes a higher standard
than the "burdensome" standard previously relied upon in Washington. Thus, this higher standard
necessarily imposes a more restrictive approach to when shareholders are entitled to vote as a sepa-
rate voting group.
103. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2005), with WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23B. 10.040 (2003). This similarity gives Washington courts an indication of the direction in which
they will be heading in terms of restricting voting group rights when interpreting the Amended
Washington Act provision. See discussion infra Part IV.
104. See supra note 101.
105. See supra note 12. Although a statute can grant broad corporate powers while delineating
exceptions, the author opines that the delineations suggest a desire to be more liberal in granting
shareholders protections to their ownership interests. Thus, Washington's historically liberal phi-
losophy is actually supported more by the fact that, despite the somewhat permissive nature of the
Model Act, the voting rights are somewhat more protected because the voting right automatically
exists with shareholder voting groups "if the proposed amendment would affect the class [or series]
in any of the ways specifically enumerated." See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 264 (1971).
106. These instances include when the amendment would "increase or decrease the aggregate
number of authorized shares of such class, increase or decrease the par value of the shares of such
class, or alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so as to
affect them adversely." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2005). Such language suggests a more
permissive approach to corporate governance than what Washington has traditionally permitted.
Additionally, because Washington eliminated the financial aspect of par value in 1980, these in-
stances equate to only two of the nine enumerated situations found in Washington's statute. Com-
pare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2005), with WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.10.040 (2003).
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.10.030 (2003).
108. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2005).
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an undesirable tension between Washington's attempt to incorporate a
new and more restrictive philosophy while simultaneously trying to
maintain substantive aspects that reflect Washington's historically liberal
underlying voting group rights philosophy.
IV. CASE STUDIES OF THE RESTRICTIONS TO VOTrNG GROUPS
Although Washington's corporate law is patterned after the Model
Act, both Delaware's statute and the Amended Washington Act now
contain analogous provisions. Because of these similarities, a closer look
into the judicial interpretations of Delaware's provision and the courts'
interpretations of statutes patterned after the Model Act illuminates
Washington's recent transition to a more restrictive voting group
philosophy.
A. Cases from Delaware and Other Jurisdictions
Following Delaware's Corporate Law
1. Delaware Cases
The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that "the jurispru-
dence of class vot[ing] in Delaware is not highly developed."' 10 9 Thus,
only a few Delaware cases actually involve situations in which the court
was required to decide if shareholders were entitled to vote as a separate
voting group because the proposed amendment adversely affected those
shareholders. 0 One case in particular that set the stage for Delaware,
and that later became Delaware's codified standard for proposed
amendments that "adversely affected" shareholders, is Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. W.S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Co."' In Hartford,
the court was asked to determine whether a proposed amendment to a
corporate charter that would double the company's amount of Class A
common stock was valid and could thus be submitted to the Secretary of
State for filing." 2 The plaintiffs asserted that the proposed amendment
could not be submitted because it did not receive the required majority
109. Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1993 WL 547187, at *8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1993) (citing Drex-
ler, Black & Sparks, DEL. CORP. LAW AND PRACTICE § 32.04 (1993)).
110. Cases where the courts interpreted only the provision relating to amendments to the arti-
cles of incorporation include the following: Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 24 A.2d 315 (Del. 1942); Dalton v. Am. Inv.
Co., 490 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1985); Orban, 1993 WL 547187. The author has been unable to find
any other Delaware cases where the court interprets Delaware's provision pertaining only to voting
group rights on amendments to the articles of incorporation; most cases involved corporate mergers,
thereby invoking an entirely different provision.
111. 24 A.2d at 315.
112. Id. at 318.
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vote by the non-consenting common stockholders, who plaintiffs also
asserted should have been permitted to vote as a separate class.'13 The
Delaware Supreme Court found that the defendant company's Class A
stock holders voted separately from the preferred and remaining common
stock holders at the shareholder meeting and subsequently affirmed and
passed the proposed amendment by more than the required majority
vote.114 Further, the court held that although the remaining preferred and
common stock holders voted together as a separate group, a majority of
votes of this group had affirmed the proposed amendment even though
the vote did not consist of a majority vote of the common stock then out-
standing." 5 Subsequently, the court sustained the lower courts' decisions
and permitted the amended articles of incorporation to be submitted to
the Secretary of State for filing."
16
In its analysis, the court looked first to the type of proposed
amendments that would permit a shareholder group to vote as a separate
voting class.' 1 7 In particular, the court focused on the statutory language
of the "relative, participating, optional, or other special rights" that
would be adversely affected by a proposed amendment and determined
that "it [was] clear enough [from the construction of the statute] that the
word ['special'] was used in the sense of shares having some unusual or
superior quality not possessed by another class of shares." 1 8 However,
the court warned against confusing the relative position of one class of
shares in the scheme of capitalization with the rights incident to that class
as compared with other classes of shares. 119 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that
[although a] corporate amendment does no more than to increase
the number of shares of a preferred or superior class, the relative
position of subordinated shares is changed in the sense that they are
subjected to a greater burden. The peculiar, or special, quality with
which [these shares] are endowed, and which serves to distinguish
them from shares of another class, remains the same.120
In finding the language of the statute to be plain and to convey a clear
and definite meaning, the court refused to reconstruct the statute to find a
different meaning. 121 Finally, although there was a plausible argument
113. Id.
114. Id. at 317.
115. Id. at 322.
116. Id. at 327.
117. See id. at 318.
118. Id. at 318 (internal quotations removed).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 318-19.
121. Id. at 320.
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for protecting those shareholders that would have been burdened by the
proposed amendment by allowing them to vote as a separate class, the
court refused to trespass onto the grounds of "public policy and economy
... under the appearance of construction.' ' 122 Thus, the court completely
rejected the more liberal philosophy that would have included an under-
lying purpose of the amendment being "burdensome" to the shareholders
and instead incorporated a more restrictive philosophy requiring amend-
ments to adversely affect shareholders.
Next, in looking at the contractual rights of the shareholders as
found in the corporate charter, 123 the court found that although the corpo-
rate charter granted exclusive voting rights to the preferred and common
stockholders, except in the case of specified defaults, 24 the charter did
not give the common shares the right to veto by class vote. 125 The court
refused to "reconstruct the contract by giving to the common shares a
right never intended to be given. ' '0 26 Because neither the articles of in-
corporation nor the statutory provision provided a means for the minority
shareholders to vote as a separate voting class, the court held that the
non-consenting common stock shareholders were not entitled to vote as a
separate voting class. 127 Thus, with this decision, Delaware's Supreme
Court introduced a very restrictive philosophy for minority shareholders
and a very broadly permissive philosophy for a corporation to govern its
affairs with very limited intervention by voting groups.
After Hartford, the Delaware courts have very narrowly and restric-
tively interpreted the phrase "adversely affected" so that shareholders are
hard-pressed to find situations in which they are entitled to vote as a
separate voting class. 28 For example, in Williams v. Geier,129 the Dela-
ware Supreme Court was asked to determine whether an amendment that
would recapitalize the corporation's financial structure was valid where
the recapitalization would substantially benefit the majority shareholders
and where a majority of all outstanding shares had voted in the affirma-
tive. 130 The court held that Delaware General Corporation Law did not
require a majority of the outstanding minority shares to vote in favor of a
transaction which necessarily benefits the majority shareholders.' 31 The
122. Id.





128. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
129. 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 1382.
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court clarified the role of a "majority of the minority vote" by explaining
that "[w]here ... there is a controlling stockholder or controlling bloc,
there is no requirement under the Delaware General Corporation Law
that the transaction be structured or conditioned so as to require an af-
firmative vote of a majority of the minority group of outstanding
shares."132 Thus, Delaware's courts began reinforcing its more restrictive
philosophy by finding very few situations, if any, in which amendments
to the articles of incorporation adversely affect shareholders to the extent
that entitles them to vote as a separate voting group.
A final example of Delaware's courts narrowly interpreting Dela-
ware's voting group rights provision and consequently expanding its re-
strictive philosophy over voting group rights involved the Delaware
Chancery Court holding that a plan of recapitalization in anticipation of a
corporate merger did not give rise to voting group rights. 33 In Orban, the
recapitalization plan would have increased the total number of common
stock shares, thereby decreasing the plaintiffs percentage ownership of
the common shares to under a majority ownership of the common
stock. 134 The plaintiffs asserted that the recapitalization plan "required
approval by the common stock voting as a separate class, which was not
obtained." 135 In dismissing this assertion, Chancellor Allen looked first to
the certificate of incorporation and found no creation of a right to vote as
a separate class. 136 Additionally, in determining that § 242(b) of Dela-
ware's statute also did not create a right for the minority shareholders to
vote as a class, Chancellor Allen reasoned along the same lines as in
Hartford: the right to vote in this particular instance was "not a peculiar
or special characteristic of common stock in the capital structure" and
that "all classes of stock share that characteristic; the voting power of
each class of stock would be pro-rata diluted by the issuance of [a new
series of preferred stock] and thus all were entitled to vote equally (in
one general class) on the amendment."' 37 In perpetuating its underlying
restrictive approach to voting group rights, Delaware's courts have sel-
dom found situations in which any shareholders have been adversely af-
fected by the proposed amendments.
138
132. Id.
133. Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1993 WL 547187 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1993).
134. Id. at *3.
135. Id. at *5.
136. Id. at *7-8.
137. Id. at *8.
138. In fact, the author has been unable to locate any Delaware cases in which a court found a
situation that adversely affected the shareholders and thereby granted them the fight to vote as a
voting group.
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2. Other Jurisdictions Following Delaware's Corporate Law
As in Delaware, other jurisdictions closely following Delaware's
corporate law have similarly determined that there are few, if any, in-
stances in which a shareholder's interest is adversely affected by a pro-
posed amendment, thereby entitling the shareholders to vote as a separate
voting group. 139 One example is Achey v. Linn County Bank, DSP, in
which the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas was asked to in-
terpret a Kansas statute virtually identical to Delaware's corporate law
statute. 14 In Achey, the corporation presented an amendment that pro-
posed a reverse stock split, 14 1 decreasing the aggregate number of shares
and eliminating the minority shareholders. 142 In determining that the
relevant statutory provisions did not "prohibit a corporation with a single
class of stock from amending its articles of incorporation so as to effect a
reverse stock split,' 43 the court held that "the minority shareholders...
[did] not have the power to veto a reverse stock split that would elimi-
nate minority shareholders.' 144 The court reasoned that the statutory lan-
guage in dispute "applie[d] in the context of several classes of stock and
prevent[ed] the vote of the members of one class from affecting the
rights of members of a different class"' 145 and that the relevant statutory
provision was "a procedural provision, not one of limitation.' 146 Conse-
quently, this decision suggests that courts in jurisdictions following
Delaware's corporate law and that incorporate the phrase "adversely af-
fected" will be less likely to find situations where minority shareholders
are entitled to vote as a separate voting group.1
4 7
139. Other than the cited case, examples from other jurisdictions that closely follow Dela-
ware's corporate law include: TLXAcquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1024 (W.D.
Okla. 1987) (mentioning the relevant statute's requirements in an acquisition and merger setting, but
not addressing any substantive issues pertaining to that statute); and Health Midwest v. Kline, No.
02-cv-08043, 2003 WL 328845, at *27 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Feb. 6, 2003) (citing the relevant statute only
and not reaching any substantive aspects of the statute).
140. 966 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Kan. 1997).
141. A reverse stock split is defined as a "reduction in the number of a corporation's shares by
calling in all outstanding shares and reissuing fewer shares having greater value." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1459 (8th ed. 2005).
142. Achey, 966 F. Supp. at 1028-29.
143. Id. at 1029.
144. Id.
145. Id. (internal quotations removed).
146. Id. (internal quotations removed).
147. There are no other cases directly on point that relate to voting groups from jurisdictions
that follow Delaware's General Corporation Law. See supra note 138.
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B. Cases from Other Model Business Corporation Act Jurisdictions
Like the courts in Delaware and the courts in jurisdictions adopting
Delaware's voting group rights provision, courts in jurisdictions that
have adopted the Model Act with provisions similar to the Amended
Washington Act have not found instances where shareholders are ad-
versely affected to the point of warranting voting group rights. For ex-
ample, in Shanken v. Lee Wolfinan, Inc., a corporation attempted to in-
crease the aggregate number of shares of its Class A and Class B stock,
but not the Class C stock.' 48 The plaintiff contended that under both the
certificate of incorporation and the Texas Business Corporation Act, the
Class C stock should have been permitted to vote as a separate voting
class. The plaintiff further argued that because the Class C stock did not
pass the amendment by a required two-thirds majority vote, the amend-
ment was null and void, even though it passed by over a two-thirds ma-
jority vote by both the Class A and the Class B stockholders. 49 In look-
ing to both the charter and the Texas Business Corporation Act, the
Court of Civil Appeals held that the Class C shareholders were not enti-
tled to vote as a separate voting group.150 The court reasoned that "the
charter amendment in question did not change the shares of Class A and
Class B stock into a different number of shares of the same class but
merely increased the aggregate number of authorized shares of such
classes as provided in [the Texas Business Corporation Act]."' 51 The
court indicated that both the certificate of incorporation and the Texas
Business Corporation Act utilized language that specifically narrowed
the privilege to vote as a separate class to instances where the amend-
ment "increase[d] or decrease[d] ... the aggregate number of authorized
shares of such class."'1
52
The court also held, in the alternative, that the effect of the amend-
ment did not change the "designations, preferences, limitations, or rela-
tive rights of the shares of 'such' class."' 53 The court relied on two
reasons for its holding:
[First,] each share of paid up stock of Class C [was] still entitled to
the same dividend and [had] the same voting power and weight as
each paid up share of Class A and Class B stock, although the hold-
ers of stock in Class A and B may [now have] control[led] a larger
corporate vote[; and second,] [t]he holders of Class C common
148. Shanken v. Lee Wolfman, Inc., 370 S.W.2d 197, 199 (1963).
149. Id. at 200.
150. Id. at 200-01.
151. Id. at 201.
152. Id. at 200.
153. Id. (italics in original).
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stock still enjoy[ed] the peculiar and special right provided in the
charter to [director] elections.
154
Therefore, the court concluded that "[t]he quality and relative rights of
the shares in each class, as distinguished from the relative position of the
classes in the capital structure, [had] remained identical."' 55 However,
such a holding actually vitiates shareholder voting group rights because it
fails to recognize the overarching restrictions of the statutory language
rather than the two very narrow instances addressed by the court. Hence,
jurisdictions patterning their corporate laws after either Delaware or the
Model Act that also incorporate the "adversely affected" language into
their statutes impose a more restrictive philosophy which ultimately pre-
vents courts from finding a basis for shareholder voting group rights.
V. THE AMENDMENTS ALTERED WASHINGTON'S TRUE PHILOSOPHY
FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS
The recent technical and substantive changes, Washington's his-
torical corporate law, and judicial interpretation of various corporate law
indicate that the legislature's recent amendments to Washington's Busi-
ness Corporation Act have altered Washington's traditionally liberal cor-
porate law philosophy into a contrary permissive philosophy for corpora-
tions and into an even more restrictive philosophy for voting groups.
156
Although some of the technical changes were relatively minor and add to
consistency and clarification,1 57 the substantive changes to the statutory
language imply a more restrictive philosophy. First, the inclusion of the
phrase "adversely affect" more restrictively qualifies the situations in
which voting group rights arise. 158 Second, since the deletion of the word
"decrease" from subsection one centers on the fact that a decrease in the
aggregate number of shares will not adversely affect the shareholders,
159
154. Id. at 201.
155. Id.
156. See discussion supra Parts II-IV. Washington practitioners have already recognized this
attempt to conform more closely to Delaware's more restrictive philosophy. See generally Landefeld
et al., supra note 62, at § 9.11.
157. See ORRICK WASH. CORP. LAW UPDATE, WASHINGTON AMENDS THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT, http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/l73.pdf.
158. See discussion supra Part III.B.
159. Although there appears to be "little potential for harm to existing [share]holders" from a
decrease in the aggregate number of shares in that class or series, see WASHINGTON SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 44, at § 10.040-45 history & committee cmt., there are still many states that have retained
this language in their statutory provisions. The following thirty-two states have retained the clause
"increase or decrease the aggregate number of shares of the class" in their respective statutory provi-
sions: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Ver-
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this change restricts shareholders from voting entirely when any form of
a decrease occurs. And third, the addition of a provision which allows
corporations to opt out of the statutorily imposed voting rights further
empowers the corporation to remove and restrict what once was a liberal
shareholder voting right.' 
60
Perhaps more importantly, however, is that Washington's history of
voting group rights indicates a legislative intent to provide more protec-
tions to minority shareholders through these voting group rights, even
though the statutes were simultaneously created to enable corporations to
use a somewhat broader and more discretionary power to govern. 161 Al-
though legislative intent may change over time and subsequent changes
may be necessary to modernize Washington's corporate law,' 62 such
modernization 163 to Washington's corporate law should not discount the
fact that Washington has for nearly 150 years consistently protected and
expanded the liberal protections afforded to shareholder voting groups.'
64
Moreover, such modernization should not be promulgated at the expense
of minority shareholder protections of their economic interests. These
severe qualifications to voting groups rights represent a dramatic and
restrictive alteration to Washington's corporate law by the legislature.
Finally, judicial interpretation from jurisdictions adopting the
Model Act-which contains the same language as the Amended Wash-
ington Act-are precluding shareholders from voting as separate voting
groups. In looking to the case law,' 65 courts that have resolved disputes
mont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming; and the following 14 States have either eliminated the
entire provision or do not contain "decrease" from their statutory counterparts: Florida, Iowa, Lou-
isiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Id. Interestingly, even Delaware, with its restrictive
"adversely affect" clause, has opted to leave in the term "decrease." See supra note 96. This sug-
gests that there continues to be an implicit underlying philosophy to grant broad and liberal share-
holder powers, even though courts are not interpreting the statutes in this manner.
160. See discussion supra Part III.B.
161. See discussion supra Part 1I. See also supra notes 30, 31, 35, 41, 47.
162. See discussion supra Part lI.B. See also supra notes 29, 30, 34, 41, 47.
163. In terms of the process to modernize Washington's corporate law, a plausible argument
can be made that the changes to Washington's Business Corporation Act produce cost savings to the
corporations. See Coonrod, supra note 69. These potential cost savings come in the form of transac-
tional or administrative cost savings because the corporation will have fewer votes to consider and a
group vote will not amount to unwanted extortion costs. Interview with Professor Eric Chiappinelli,
Associate Dean, Seattle University School of Law, in Seattle, Wa. (Mar. 2, 2006).
164. See discussion supra Part 11.
165. In researching this issue, the author discovered that the vast majority of litigated problems
dealt with differences between shareholders and directors in the terms and conditions to mergers.
Washington, like most states, has separate provisions pertaining to mergers and acquisitions. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 23B. 11.035 (2003). Washington's sister statute for mergers, which was enacted
at the same time as the voting groups statute, is almost identical in the types of situations in which
shareholders are entitled to vote as a separate voting group. See id. However, a discussion of this
particular provision is outside the scope of this Comment.
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over amendments to the articles of incorporation have been very reluc-
tant to find shareholders to be "adversely affected" by the amendment
166
and are consequently much more restrictive in permitting voting group
rights. Thus, Washington can anticipate court interpretations with simi-
larly restrictive results to shareholders when disputes over amendments
arise. 167 Such interpretation would be inconsistent with Washington's
traditionally liberal protections of shareholder voting rights.
VI. A PROPOSITION FOR WASHINGTON'S BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
Because the Amended Washington Act now recognizes a more re-
strictive underlying philosophy for shareholder voting groups that is con-
trary to Washington's historically liberal philosophy, the legislature
should revise Washington's voting group provision. First, the qualifying
phrase "adversely affected" should be deleted and replaced with the for-
mer term "burdensome." This would embody Washington's more liberal
philosophy and the previously underlying legislative intent to protect
minority shareholders' voting rights.
Second, the term "decrease" should be reinserted to provide voting
group rights when a decrease in the aggregate number of shares occurs,
once again allowing the shareholders to exercise more liberal voting
rights, even when proposed amendments may be advantageous to the
shareholders' position.
And finally, in light of the more recent catastrophes involving cor-
porate flexibility,' 68 the newly added aspects of the provision that pro-
vide for added corporate flexibility should be deleted. By eliminating the
provisions that provide for more corporate flexibility, Washington's
166. Out of the cases litigated so far that have dealt with amendments to the articles of incorpo-
ration that ultimately involve voting groups, only two issues have been presented: first, whether the
rights or preferences have been changed or reduced; and second, whether an increase or decrease in
the aggregate number of shares affected the shareholders of that particular class. See discussion
supra Part IV. This equates to only two of the nine enumerated instances found in the Amended
Washington Act. See supra note 13. Thus, courts had not come close to exhausting the possibilities
for interpreting shareholder voting group rights under the more liberal philosophy.
167. An argument can be made that Washington courts will have very few instances in which
to intervene because most corporations will either recognize that an amendment will adversely affect
the minority shareholders, and thus permit them to vote as a separate voting group, or else the corpo-
rate attorneys will err on the side of caution and counsel the corporations to permit the affected class
to vote as a separate voting group. However, the author is of the opinion that this argument begs the
question of why the corporations or corporate attorneys would be unable to make that determination
under the more liberal "burdensome" standard. To the contrary, the fact that this is not an area heav-
ily litigated suggests that 1) corporations were already aware under the previous philosophy when
proposed amendments were "burdensome" to shareholders, or 2) attorneys were already doing a
fantastic job under the previous philosophy of advising corporations of the situations whereby share-
holders would be permitted to vote as separate voting groups.
168. See discussion supra Part I. See discussion supra note 2.
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corporate law would be providing minority shareholders once again with
the tool by which they can protect their economic interests in the corpo-
ration: the voting group.
With these changes in place, minority shareholders would have in-
creased capacity to block proposed amendments to the articles of incor-
poration that would be detrimental to their investment in the corporation.
Without this vote, majority shareholders, who may have little economic
interest in the company, would be able to commandeer the minority
shareholders' economic investment in a potentially catastrophic way.
The current status of Washington's corporate law now allows for such an
outcome. And although providing for more corporate flexibility might
initially have some appeal, ultimately very few, if any, investors are go-
ing to want to invest in a company in which they cannot protect their
economic investments as a minority shareholder. Thus, a return to
Washington's previous philosophy of more liberal shareholder voting
rights is merited.
VII. CONCLUSION
Beginning in 1866 and continuing through today, Washington's
corporate law has undergone a transformation consisting of various
stages. One such stage involved the recent amendment to RCW
23B.10.040, which pertains to a particular aspect of shareholder voting
that permits voting groups to vote separately on proposed amendments to
the articles of incorporation. Such amendments at this stage have conse-
quently altered Washington's previously liberal shareholder voting group
philosophy.
The history of Washington's corporate law, and in particular the
history pertaining to its voting groups, shows an underlying intent to pro-
tect minority shareholders interests through means of voting group rights.
In light of this history, the recent amendments have ultimately altered
Washington's corporate governance philosophy. Although the statutory
language has been changed for clarification purposes, additions and al-
terations in the substantive language have created a more restrictive phi-
losophy. The case law from Delaware, as well as from other jurisdictions
interpreting statutory language similar to Washington's, indicates a much
more narrow interpretation that severely restricts shareholder voting
group rights.
However, Washington can return to its liberal philosophy with a
few strokes of the pen by deleting the qualifying phrase "adversely af-
fected," and by reinserting the term "decrease" to allow voting groups to
vote even where the amendment is advantageous to them. Additionally,
eliminating the bases of added corporate flexibility will realign
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Washington's Business Corporation Act with its historically more liberal
philosophy. Accordingly, minority shareholders of Washington corpora-
tions will once again enjoy the more liberal protections once afforded
them under Washington's true shareholder voting group philosophy.
